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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IRA K, HEARN, JR., 
Peri rioner, 
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 14269 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
:f: "4< :f: :=§: ::>[c 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
' I his is a petition foi review' of the decision of the t Jtali 
Liquor Control Commission issued September 3, 1975, and 
predicated on a hearing held on August 22, ° '>, dismissing 
the Petitioner as Hi rector of the Utah Liquor Control Commissioi i 
The petition is filed under the provisions of §32-1-32.6, UCA 
1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION BY THE 
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION 
Following the hearing on August 22, 1975, the Utali 
I ,iquoi Coiiti ol Commission issued its order dated September 3, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1975, removing and dismissing Petitioner as Director of the 
Utah Liquor Control Commission, effective as of said September 3, 
1975. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the Utah 
Liquor Control Commission and the reinstatement of Petitioner 
as Director of said Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner has set forth in detail the nature of the proceed-
ing for which review and reversal is sought by this petition in his 
Petition for Review served and filed with this Honorable Court on 
September 25, 1975. Thereafter, by order of this Honorable 
Court, dated November 5, 1975, pursuant to stipulation of counsel, 
Petitioner was granted to and including the first day of December, 
1975, in which to file Petitioner's Brief in support of his Petition 
for Review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
THE HEARING BEFORE THE UTAH 
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION 
ON AUGUST 22, 1975 DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE "CAUSE" FOR REMOVAL 
FROM OFFICE AS REQUIRED BY 
SECTION 32-1-5.5(3), UCA 1953, 
AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 90 
LAWS OF UTAH 1975 
-2-
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The applicable statute, §32-1-5.5(3), UCA 1953, as 
amended by Chapter 90 Laws of Utah 1975, provides that the 
Director of the Utah Liquor Control Commission Mmay only 
be removed from office for cause after a public hearing by a 
majority vote of the Commission/' 
By letter dated August 14, 1975, the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission notified the Petitioner that a hearing would be held 
on the 22nd day of August, 1975, to determine whether or not 
the Commission should remove Petitioner as Director of the 
Utah Liquor Control Commission. By that letter, the Commis-
sion stated its "cause" for its intended removal of the Director 
as follows: 
"It is the opinion of the Commission that 
difficulties have arisen over the last six months 
between the Director of the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission and the Commission members. It 
is the Commission's opinion that these difficulties 
prevent us from working amicably and cohesively 
with you as Director of the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission. Because of this, we feel that the 
Commission's business is not being carried out 
in a cooperative manner nor with a singleness of 
purpose." 
By letter of August 19, 1975, directed to Robert B. Hansen, 
Deputy Attorney General of the State of Utah, then acting counsel 
for Petitioner, the Utah Liquor Control Commission submitted an 
additional alleged "cause" for removal by stating that, " . . .we feel 
-3-
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there has been a general deterioration of communication and 
direction between the Commission and Director which leaves 
the Commission with no confidence in the Director." 
At the hearing on August 22, 1975, the Chairman of 
the Utah Liquor Control Commission, Gerald E. Hulbert, and 
the Commissioners, Herbert J. Corkey, Jr. and Ernest F . 
Durbano, without being sworn, testified as to the Commis-
sion's purported "cause" for Petitioner's removal. The said 
"causes" testified to by the Chairman and Commissioners are 
set forth in detail on pages 10 through 22 of Petitioner's Petition 
for Review on file herein, together with Petitioner's response 
to each said "cause" or charge for removal. These purported 
"causes" for removal so testified to may be summarized as fol-
lows: 
(1) Alleged insubordination and lack of loyalty to 
the principles of law. 
(2) Unauthorized signing by Petitioner of the employ-
ment contract with Mr. Thomas H. Kemp. 
(3) Petitioner's report to the Commission, as r e -
quested, concerning a cost study as to the data input system. 
(4) Petitioner's letter of April 17, 1975, to Governor 
Calvin L. Rampton complaining that the Commission evidently 
-4-
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had no intention of following the Governor's outline (guidelines) 
as to respective duties of the Commissioners and the Director. 
(5) Reports of shortages in various stores of the Utah 
Liquor Control Commission during the months of February-April , 
1975. 
(6) Commissioner Corkey's opinion that Petitioner's 
TT
.. .day-to-day direction had not been what it should be or we 
would not have the morale problem referred to . " 
(7) Petitioner's alleged desire to change the system 
of government from a commission to a directorship. 
It will be noted that the testimony of the Chairman and 
Commissioners was not responsive to the broad charges of cause 
for dismissal set forth in the Commission's let ters of August 14, 
1975 and August 19, 1975. 
Following the hearing, and by its letter of September 3, 
1975, the Utah Liquor Control Commission made findings of fact. 
Only five of the findings can be identified as relating to the alleged 
causes for dismissal testified to by the Commissioners at the 
hearing on August 22, 1975. They are as follows: 
Finding #1: Responds to number four above that Petitioner 
directed a letter dated April 17, 1975, to Governor Rampton com-
plaining that the Commission evidently had no intention of following 
- 5 -
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the Governor's written guidelines concerning the respective 
duties of the Commissioners and the Director. 
Finding #2: Responds to number two above concern-
ing Petitioner's alleged unauthorized signing of the employment 
contract with Thomas H. Kemp. 
Findings #5 and #10: Respond to number four above 
concerning Petitioner's recommendations as to in-house key 
taping procedure. 
Finding #6: Responds to number seven above con-
cerning Petitioner's expressed desire to change the admini-
stration from a full time commission to a part-time commis-
sion and full time directorship. 
These five findings do relate to the alleged causes for 
dismissal testified to by the Chairman and Commissioners, 
However, they are not responsive to the grounds for removal 
or dismissal set forth in the Commission's letters of August 
14, 1975 and August 19, 1975, which are limited to alleged 
general "difficulties" between the Director and the Commission, 
and a "general deterioration of communication between the 
Commission and Director which leaves the Commission with 
no confidence in the Director." 
The remaining eight findings are neither supported by 
-6-
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the charges of causes stated in the letters of August 14, 1975 
and August 19, 1975, nor are they responsive to the testimony 
of the Commissioners. Rather, they relate to new and extrane-
ous matters developed in testimony and documents introduced 
for the first time at the hearing, as follows: 
Finding #3: Failure to route to the Commission 
Governor RamptonTs letter requesting information to assist in 
responding to Richard B. Kinnersley's letter of August 5, 1975. 
Finding #4: Petitioner's letter of March 5, 1975, con-
cerning a proposed pay increase for Clara Pratt. 
Finding #8: Petitioner's alleged refusal on August 18, 
1975, to sign a personnel action form. 
Findings #7, #9, #11, #12 and #13: These findings 
apparently complain of Ma difference of management philosophy' 
and conflicts in the interpretation of the allocation of duties and 
responsibilities of the Director and Commissioners as outlined 
by Governor Rampton's written guidelines of January 20, 1975, 
and as set forth in Chapter 90 Laws of Utah 1975, which became 
effective March 13, 1975. 
Petitioner's response to these additional findings and his 
reference to the supporting record are fully set forth in Petitioner's 
Petition for Review on file herein. 
-7-
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Since these additional findings were not supported by the 
testimony of the Chairman or Commissioners nor by charges 
set forth in their letters of August 14, 1975 and August 19, 1975, 
Petitioner respectfully submits that he had no opportunity to ex-
plain or rebut the additional charges contained in the said findings, 
and they are unavailable to support the alleged basis for his dis-
missal. 
It may well be that the failure of the letters of August 14, 
1975 and August 19, 1975 to set forth in detail or with sufficient 
particularity the alleged causes for Petitioner's dismissal renders 
it unnecessary for this Court to consider the purported evidence 
allegedly supporting his dismissal. 
The law as to this point is set forth in State ex rel Hart v. 
Common Council of Duluth, decided by the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota on May 9, 1893, and reported at 55 N.W. 118, 121. 
There, the Court stated MSince none of the charges relied on are 
sufficient in law . . . this renders it unnecessary to consider the 
evidence at all ." 
The law as to what constitutes cause for removal of a 
public officer where TTcauseM for removal is required by statute, 
is most cogently set forth in the 1951 decision of the Supreme 
Court of Utah in Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah 302, 226 P2d 531. In 
-8-
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that case, Justice Latimer, speaking for an undivided Court, stated: 
"The reason for throwing this cloak of pro-
tection around an office-holder is to assure to him 
the right granted by the statute; namely, that he 
shall be removed for cause only and not for political 
or trifling reasons . . . . Removing for cause takes 
a form of punishment, it infers that the office-holder 
has failed to perform his duties or was incompetent 
or unsuitable for the position to which he was appointed 
and directly reflects upon his official or personal 
qualifications Cognizance should be taken 
of the fact that he who originally hears the charges 
has, in most instances, already arrived at a decision 
to remove, and, as a consequence, the original 
hearing is before one who lacks the impartiality 
of a disinterested judge.tT 
The Court continues (226 P2d 540) M . . .the Governor should 
not remove an officer, which act carries with it the possible ruina-
tion of the man removed, until and unless there is some showing by 
misconduct or otherwise that he does not possess the qualifications, 
fitness and ability to perform the duties of his office M 
Here, as in the Taylor case, there having been no conten-
tion that Petitioner was guilty of fraud or dishonesty in connection 
with any of the transactions referred to, Mthis admission limits the 
issues largely to the question of incompetency or inefficiency on 
the part of the plaintiff We believe that before casting a 
shadow on a man's character or his capacity to hold office, a 
showing of unfitness is required We believe removal from 
a position of honor and trust for cause is a harsh remedy which 
-9-
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should be limited to cases where the evidence reasonably estab-
lishes that the office-holder failed to meet the ordinary standards 
of competency and efficiency/' 
Mr. Justice Crockett in State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 
407 P2d 571, had occasion to reverse the dismissal of the County 
Auditor of Salt Lake County under §77-7-1, UCA 1953, which pro-
vided for removal for high crimes, misdemeanors or malfeasance 
in office. In that case, Mr. Justice Crockett, speaking for an un-
divided Court, stated, "These statutes are not of common law 
origin, but are creatures of legislative enactment, and due to 
the seriousness of their consequences, both to the individual in 
the forfeiture of his office, and as an intervention in the process 
of democracy, proceedings under them are properly regarded as 
quasi-criminal in nature. Accordingly, the statute should be 
strictly construed against the authority invoking it and liberally 
in favor of the one against whom it is asserted.M 
The general rule is stated at 67 Corpus Juris Secundum 
§60 page 248 as follows: 
MThe cause must be one which specially relates 
to and affects the administration of the office, and 
must be restricted to something of a substantial nature 
directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. 
An officer should not be removed from office on trivial 
or inconsequential matters, or for mere technical vio-
lations of statute or official duty without wrongful in-
tention. The entire record of the employee sought to 
-10-
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be discharged, including that prior to the time 
the administrative official took office, is r e -
viewable in determining whether just cause 
exists for the discharge of the employee." 
Justice Larson, in a dissenting opinion, in State ex rel 
Hammond v. Maxfield, 103 Utah 1, 43, 132 P2d 660, quotes with 
approval from Mecham on Public Officers as follows: 
"Section 452: Authority to remove for cause 
cannot be construed as an implied authority to 
remove at pleasure." 
It is respectfully submitted that a review of the record as 
set forth in the Petition for Review and attachments thereto must 
leave the Court with an understanding that in the case at bar 
Petitioner's removal was without cause and solely for trivial 
and inconsequential matters strictly of a political nature and 
reflecting no stigma as to the competence or willingness of the 
Petitioner to perform his duties. 
Testing the initial charges of "cause" against the accepted 
legal interpretations of that term, it is apparent that "difficulties" 
and "lack of communication" do not measure up to "cause" for 
dismissal. There is not a public officer alive who could not be 
discharged "for cause" if "difficulties" and "lack of communication" 
were sufficient grounds to make out "cause." 
Considering the testimony of the Chairman and Commis-
sioners and testing their unsworn statements against statutory 
-11-
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"cause", several preliminary circumstances call attention to 
themselves. 
First, the three witnesses rely upon widely differing 
grounds. One, the Chairman, Mr. Hulbert, speaks of insubor-
dination and lack of loyalty to principles of law (whatever that 
may have meant to the witness). He also complains of Petitioner's 
allegedly unauthorized signing of an employment contract with 
Mr. Kemp, and finishes by referring to his disagreement with 
Petitioner's written report, as requested, giving his judgment as 
to the relative undesirability of engaging an outside firm to do the 
data input or key taping operations against continued use of in-
house personnel. The second, Commissioner Corkey, complains 
that Petitioner wrote the Governor reporting that the carefully 
worked out guidelines as to the respective duties of the Com-
missioners and Director were not being followed. He also com-
plains vaguely of newly emerging reports showing shortages in 
various stores revealed by the new accounting system initiated 
by Petitioner. The third, Commissioner Durbano, complains 
that Petitioner has different views from the Commissioners as 
to an efficient organizational structure for the Commission. 
One would think that if any specific incompetence or mis-
conduct justified dismissal, the three members might agree in 
-12-
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focusing on such cause in their testimony. Rather, they seem 
to be searching about for McausetT hoping to find some peg upon 
which to hang their decision. 
Second, the proliferation and multiplicity of alleged 
"causes" and the willingness of the Commissioners to shift their 
ground from their initial charges, to their statements at the 
hearing, and finally, to the widely differing grounds set forth 
in their MfindingstT, suggests the shallowness of their position. 
It demonstrates that the causes testified to and relied on are 
really afterthoughts dredged up to justify a decision already 
arrived at for other reasons . 
Certainly Mr. Hearn was not dismissed because he mis -
takenly failed to route the Governor's letter from Mr. Kinnersley 
to the Commissioners. Nor was he discharged because his 
report and recommendations as to in-house key taping differed 
with what the Commissioners wanted to hear . Nor could Mr. 
Hearn's firing have resulted from his signing the employment 
contract with Mr. Kemp after the Commission obtained the funds 
it requested for this purpose, the employee had been cleared, and 
the contract had been approved as to form for the Director 's 
signature by the very counsel who now represents the Com-
mission. Nor could the Commission really complain that Mr. 
Hearn felt obliged to let the Governor know that the guidelines 
-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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so carefully worked out by the Governor personally were not 
being applied or followed by the Commission notwithstanding 
the Commission's prior approval. 
The real reason for Petitioner's dismissal, and the 
"cause", if any exists, lies more in the area of "difference 
of management philosophy", differing opinions as to the allo-
cation of duties between the Commissioners and the Director 
spelled out by the Governor's guidelines of January 20, 1975, 
and later by the legislature's adoption of substantially the same 
allocations in Chapter 90, Laws of Utah 1975. More specifi-
cally, the real cause must be found in Petitioner's statements 
to the Citizens Council and to Commissioner Durbano that he 
favored a part-time Commission and a full time Director. This 
is the insubordination and lack of loyalty to principles of law 
referred to without further specification by Chairman Hulbert. 
This is the so-called lack of loyalty to the "Commission" com-
plained of in Finding #9. It forms the underlying basis for 
Findings #12 and #13. 
The issue as to allocation of duties and organizational 
structure of the Utah Liquor Control Commission had been pro-
minently brought to the attention of the Legislature, the Com-
mission, the Governor and the Citizens Council long before the 
-14-
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Petitioner was asked to give his views to the Citizens Council. 
Having served as Commissioner and then as Director, Mr. 
Hearn had desirable background from which to express a quali-
fied opinion and judgment. The issue was very much in the 
public eye and was of considerable interest to the public. Mr. 
Hearn had as much right to express his view that a part-time 
Commission and full time Director was more desirable as did 
the Commissioners that they preferred a full time Commission. 
If the issue had not been mandated for study by the Governor and 
Legislature, Mr. Hearn's expression of his views might have 
seemed somewhat presumptuous. Under the existing circum-
stances, it was an honest and qualified expression of a convic-
tion deeply held, an exercise of freedom of speech, and does 
not constitute cause for dismissal even though the Commissioners 
held differing views in their own interests. Furthermore, Mr. 
Hearn's views as to the allocation of general policy-making to 
the Commissioners and day-to-day administration and direction 
to the Director, was consistent both with the views of the Governor 
and of the Legislature. His opinion that three full time Commis-
sioners were neither necessary nor desirable for the formulation 
of policy and tended to provoke conflict and controversy in day-to-
day administration was sound, qualified, and in the best interests 
-15-
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of sound public administration of the agency. Surely, his courage 
in expressing these views does not constitute a lawful "cause" for 
his dismissal. His views are more in the area of differing politi-
cal views which should be encouraged rather than punished. 
There are a number of decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Utah which, though somewhat collateral, may be of some assis-
tance to the Court: People v. McAllister, 10 Utah 357, 37 P 578; 
Pratt v. Board of Police and Fire Commissioners, 15 Utah 1, 49 
P 747; Heath v. Salt Lake City, 16 Utah 374, 52 P 602; Pratt v. 
Swan, 16 Utah 483, 52 P 1092; Gilbert v. Board of Commissioners, 
11 Utah 378, 40 P 264; Silvey v. Boyle, 20 Utah 205, 57 P 880; 
State v. Beardsley, 13 Utah 502, 45 P 569; Taylor v. Gunderson, 
107 Utah 437, 154 P 2d 653; Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board 
of Commissioners, 71 Utah 593, 268 P 783; Everill v. Swan, 17 
Utah 514, 55 P 68; State ex rel Hammond v. Maxfield, 103 Utah 1, 
132 P 2d 660. See also State v. Board of Regents of University of 
Nevada, 269 P 2d 265; Sausbier v. Wheeler, (1937) 299 New York 
Supp. 466; and the exhaustive annotation at 99 ALR 336-405. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION DID NOT REGU-
' LARLY PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY 
IN PROVIDING OR CONDUCTING 
A "PUBLIC HEARING" AS REQUIRED 
BY SECTION 32-1-5.5(3), UCA 1953 
AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 90 LAWS 
OF UTAH 1975 
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Petitioner has carefully pointed out some fourteen pro-
cedural errors which he claims were committed by the Com-
mission in providing and conducting the "public hearing" re-
quired by law for consideration of the evidence of "cause" for 
his dismissal. Without waiving or abandoning any of these 
alleged procedural errors, this brief will only attempt to review 
the applicable case law generally with respect to the proce-
dural requirements for such a hearing and specifically the 
case law with respect to two alleged errors; namely, failure 
to give due notice concerning the grounds or "causes" for dismis-
sal, and the denial of the right to cross examine the witnesses 
offered against Petitioner. 
Justice Bartch had the opportunity, at the turn of the 
century, to pass on a series of official removal cases before 
the Supreme Court of Utah. Perhaps his classic decision is 
that of People v. McAllister, decided July 27, 1894 and reported 
at 10 Utah 357, 37 P 578. At 10 Utah 372, Justice Bartch states: 
"The conditions of removal are express, and 
clearly set forth in the statutes, and cannot be dis-
regarded as immaterial. A removal for cause is a 
judicial act which affects the reputation and rights 
of the accused. It is in law a punishment for crime, 
and the proceeding provided by statute can no more 
be dispensed with in such a case than a court can 
disregard the statutory provisions in the trial of a 
cause where a person is charged with the commis-
sion of an offense. From an examination of the 
history of judicial proceedings, it will be seen that 
officers clothed with the power of removal for cause 
-17-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have frequently attempted its exercise at plea-
sure, ex parte, and such examination will also 
show how futile have been their efforts TT 
"The proceeding being thus a judicial one, the 
power must be exercised under the same limi-
tations, precautions, and sanctions as in any 
other judicial proceedings." 
In Taylor v. Lee, decided January 13, 1951, 119 Utah 302, 
226 P2d 531, Justice Latimer addressed himself generally to the 
procedural requirements for removal of an office-holder for cause 
and cites Bodmer v. Police Mutual Aid Association, 94 Utah 450, 78 
P2d 640. He states the minimum requirements to be as follows: 
"(1) A written notice of the nature of the 
charges couched in ordinary and understandable 
language; (2) a notice of the time and place of 
hearing; (3) an opportunity by the office-holder 
to be heard and answer the charges; (4) the right 
to be represented by counsel, with opportunity for 
cross examination; and (5) the presence of a r e -
porter to preserve the testimony so that, if neces-
sary, the question of cause can be made the sub-
j ect of j udicial review 
In For man v. Creighton School District No. 14, 87 Arizona 
329, 351 P2d 165, the Court cites Taylor v. Lee and states the r e -
quirements for procedural due process in a removal hearing before 
the Board of Trustees of the School District. 
In Napuche v. Liquor Control Commission, decided by the 
Supreme Court of Michigan on April 13, 1953, 336 Michigan 398, 
i -
58 N.W. 2d 118, the Court reviews and restates the necessary 
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procedural requirements and quotes the following from Morgan 
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 82 L. Ed. 1129: 
MThe maintenance of proper standards on the 
par t of administrative agencies in the performance 
of their quasi-judicial functions is of the highest 
importance and in no way cripples or embarrasses 
the exercise of their appropriate authority. On the 
contrary, it is in their manifest interest . For , as 
we said at the outset, if these multiplying agencies 
seemed to be necessary in our complex society are 
to serve the purposes for which they are created 
and endowed with vast powers, they must accredit 
themselves by acting in accordance with the cher-
ished judicial tradition embodying the basic con-
cepts of fair play." 
The Michigan Court then proceeds to list and itemize the proce-
dural rights to which the person charged in at least en tided and 
quotes approvingly from Hanson v. Michigan State Board of Regis-
tration in Medicine, 253 Michigan 601, 236 N.W. 225, 228. 
The case of Friedman v. State of New York decided April 
23, 1969, 24 N.Y. 2d 528, 301 N.Y.S . 2d 484 not only goes to the 
issue as to McauseM but states the requirements for proper proce-
dure and questions the combining of the functions of complainant, 
prosecutor and judge. Further as to the question whether proce-
dural due process requires the disqualification of an outspoken 
and antagonistic opponent, see Acierno v. Folsom, Supreme Court 
of Delaware (1975) 337 Atlantic 2d 309. This decision cites and 
rel ies on Kennecott Copper Corporation v. F . T . C. (Tenth Circuit) 
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467 F . 2d 67, 80 (1972). In Taylor v. Lee, 226 P2d 53, 538, 
the Court notes that where the Governor is the removing offi-
cer, Mthere is no apparent reason why the Governor should 
not appoint a referee to hear the evidence and make recom-
mended findings.M Section 32-1-32.2 UCA 1953 makes express 
provision for use of hearing officers by the Utah Liquor Con-
trol Commission. Surely both the appearance and substance 
of due process and impartial procedure would have suggested 
recourse to such a hearing officer here where the Commis-
sioners were required to pass on their own statements as 
alleged cause for dismissal. 
. , The law as to Petitioner's right to written notice of the 
charges against him constituting cause for removal is concisely 
y stated Taylor v. Lee, 226P2d531, 538, as follows: " . . . t he 
minimum requirements are these: (1) A written notice of the 
nature of the charges couched in ordinary and understandable 
language." It may be that vague references to "difficulties"be-
tween the Commissioners and the Petitioner is "ordinary" 
language, but it certainly is not "understandable" to one who 
is obliged to prepare a defense to such a charge. Nor was the 
specification of "charges" improved by the second letter from 
the Commission on August 19, 1975, three days prior to the 
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scheduled hearing, where reference is made to a feeling of 
''general deterioration of communication and direction between 
the Commission and Director which leaves the Commission 
with no confidence in the Director". 
Justice Bartch is even more specific as to the require-
ment for notice of the charges against the challenged officer. 
People v. McAllister, 10 Utah 357, 375, 37 P 357, quotes 
favorably from Dullam v. Wilson, 53 Michigan 392, 19 N.W. 
112, as follows: "There must be charges specifying the par-
ticulars in which the officer is subject to removal. It is not 
sufficient to follow the language of the constitution. The offi-
cer is entitled to know the particular acts of neglect of duty, 
or corrupt conduct, or other act relied upon as constituting 
malfeasance or misfeasance in office; and he is entitled to a 
reasonable notice of the time and place when and where an 
opportunity will be given him for a hearing, and he has a 
right to produce proof upon such hearing." Petitioner was 
handed the letter of August 14, 1975 just eight days before the 
hearing scheduled for August 22, 1975, the supplemental state-
ment of written charges was dated August 19, 1975, and when 
counsel for Petitioner asked for time to prepare his defense 
at the close of the Commissioners' statements, he was given 
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ten minutes and no more.
 v i 
There can be little doubt that Petitioner was denied 
procedural due process and the quasi-judicial proceeding 
mandated by law when, over objections of his counsel, he 
was denied the opportunity to cross examine the Commis-
sioners at the close of each Commissioner's unsworn state-
ment. : 
Mr. Justice Latimer in Taylor v. Lee lists as the 
fourth minimum requirement "the right to be represented 
by counsel with opportunity for cross examination.Tt Justice 
Bartch likens a removal hearing to the trial of a cause where 
a person is charged with the commission of an offense. Surely 
such a procedure requires an opportunity to cross examine 
adverse witnesses even though they may not have been sworn. 
People v. McAllister, supra at 10 Utah 357, 373. 
Forman v. Creighton School District No. 14, 87 Arizona 
329, 351 P2d 165, states: MThe questions thus presented are as 
follows: (1) Whether the order of the Board of Trustees which 
issued pursuant to a hearing in which petition was denied the 
right to cross examine witnesses appearing against her, denied 
to her due process of the law In connection with the first 
question, our research indicates that the over-whelming weight 
of authority holds that for an administrative body, conducting a 
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quasi-judicial hearing, to preclude the individual concerned 
from cross examining witnesses appearing against him, denies 
him due process of law.M Citing Taylor v. Lee, supra. The 
Arizona Supreme Court goes on (351 P2d 165, 167) to state that 
the person charged TTis at least entitled to (4) The right 
to cross examine the witnesses who testify against h im." 
Friedman v. State, 24 N.Y. 2d 544, 301 N.Y.S . 484, 
497, quotes Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129,19 L. Ed. 2d 956, 
to the effect that M . . . the right of cross examination (is a) 
fundamental right, the deprivation of which is e r ro r of the 
first magnitude." 
POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THE UTAH LIQUOR 
CONTROL COMMISSION ISSUED SEPTEM-
BER 3, 1975, REMOVING PETITIONER 
AS DIRECTOR OF THE SAID COMMISSION 
AND THE HEARING AND PROCEDURE BY 
WHICH IT REACHED ITS DECISION VIO-
LATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
OF THE PETITIONER 
It is unnecessary to a reversal of the order of the Utah 
Liquor Control Commission that Petitioner also establish and 
that he was deprived of procedural and substantive due process 
and his right of freedom of speech. Probably those charges are 
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more pertinent to an action for damages under the Federal Civil 
Rights Act, 42 USCS Section 1983. 
Nevertheless, it is noted in passing that Petitioner's r e -
moval resulted from his rightful expression of his views concern-
ing the more efficient organization of the Commission, and that 
he was removed without proof of lawful cause for removal as 
required by statute; and that the procedural due process guaranteed 
him by the state and federal constitutions and the state statute 
concerning his tenure of office, was denied him. 
Certainly the Commissioners acted under color of state 
law in taking each of the steps which led to Petitioner's removal. 
Whether Petitioner's right to damages under 42 USCS 
1983 depends upon a disposition of this proceeding in this Court 
favorable to Petitioner, is an issue yet to be determined by 
another court. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Utah Liquor Control Commission 
dated September 3, 1975, dismissing Petitioner, Ira K. Hearn, 
J r . , as Director of the Utah Liquor Control Commission should 
be reversed with instructions to the Commission to immediately 
reinstate Petitioner with full salary from September 3, 1975. 
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DATED this 28th day of Nov 1975, 
5I submitted, 
D. Ray C|wen, Jr, 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Suite 564 Kennecott Building 
Ten East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Petitioner, Ira K. Hearn, J r . , were duly 
mailed to William Barrett, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, 
State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114^ by^first class mail, 
postage prepaid, this 28th day of Nove 
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